La condition militaire
Si la condition militaire est une, elle connaît des déclinaisons multiples. Quelque 300 000 militaires servent au sein des trois armées, de la gendarmerie et de services communs, tous organismes dont les missions, les traditions et les cultures leur sont propres, compte tenu de la variété de leur histoire et du milieu physique et humain dans lequel ils exercent leurs activités opérationnelles. Ainsi les fonctions et les conditions d'emploi des militaires, hommes ou femmes, sont multiples: grenadier-voltigeur, sous-marinier, pilote, gendarme mobile, pompier, médecin, ingénieur, au quartier ou en camp d'entrainement, en métropole, outre-mer ou en opération extérieure... Tout en conservant une référence constante à ces principes fondateurs de la condition militaire, le présent ouvrage propose de « passer en revue » les éléments concrets essentiels qui la caractérisent, afin de permettre au lecteur d'en mieux cerner la consistance réelle.
Etat r galien et externalisation l exemple de la D fense
Peut-on contractualiser au secteur prive des activites relevant du c ur de l'Etat, autrement dit regaliennes En realite, il ne s'agit pas de privatiser la Defense, mais de confier par contrat certaines fonctions dites "detachables" des missions regaliennes. Ce processus d'externalisation procede d'une vision nouvelle de l'action de l'Etat, qui conserve la capacite de decision dans ses domaines regaliens mais peut en confier la mise en uvre a des operateurs prives, procedant d'une vision liberale de l'action de l'Etat. Apres une premiere partie pour determiner le perimetre externalisable, selon le besoin et le contexte en prenant des exemples historiques et a l'etranger, l'etude detaille la preparation et la conduite de l'externalisation dans ses dimensions contractuelles et sociales. Cette etude s'adresse en priorite aux juristes et aux etudiants ou professionnels qui s'interessent a l'evolution de la gestion publique et a la modernisation de l'Etat.
THE QUR ANIC CONCEPT OF WAR
S. K. Malik A été écrit sous une forme ou une autre pendant la plus grande partie de sa vie. Vous pouvez trouver autant d'inspiration de THE QUR ANIC CONCEPT OF WAR Aussi informatif et amusant. Cliquez sur le bouton TÉLÉCHARGER ou Lire en ligne pour obtenir gratuitement le livre de titre $ gratuitement.
Robots on the Battlefield
Ronan Doaré A été écrit sous une forme ou une autre pendant la plus grande partie de sa vie. Vous pouvez trouver autant d'inspiration de Robots on the Battlefield Aussi informatif et amusant. Cliquez sur le bouton TÉLÉCHARGER ou Lire en ligne pour obtenir gratuitement le livre de titre $ gratuitement.
Legions of Peace
The huge number of security forces stationed around the world as United Nations peace- keepers is second only to the global military deployments of the USA. But most UN peacekeepers come from the emerging powers and developing states that comprise the global South. This is the first book to analyze this phenomenon at the international level. Such unprecedented deployments show that peacekeeping is the most widely tolerated use of force in international affairs today. Far from signaling progress towards global governance, Legions of Peace argues that UN peacekeeping must be understood in the context of continuing economic inequality and the uneven distribution of global power. Philip Cunliffe contends that through UN peacekeeping Western states have used their domination of international institutions to harness the armed forces of the global South. In so doing, Western states seek to reduce the political and military costs of hegemony and stave off their inevitable, long-term decline in power. This strategy has profound political implications. Instead of transcending the "scourge of war," by globalizing peacekeeping the UN has made peace dependent on the extensive and sustained deployment of armed force--a development that bodes ill for the future.
CSIS Commission on Smart Power
America's image and influence have declined precipitously around the world. To maintain a leading role in global affairs, the United States must move from eliciting fear and anger to inspiring optimism and hope. In 2006, CSIS launched a bipartisan Commission on Smart Power to develop a vision to guide America's global engagement. This report lays out the commission's findings and a discrete set of recommendations for how the next president of the United States, regardless of political party, can implement a smart power strategy.The United States must become a smarter power by once again investing in the global good—providing things people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership. By complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in soft power, America can build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges. Specifically, the United States should focus on five critical areas detailed in this report: alliances and institutions, global development, public diplomacy, economic integration, and technology and innovation.Implementing a smart power strategy will require a strategic reassessment of how the U.S. government is organized, coordinated, and budgeted. The next president should consider a number of creative solutions to maximize the administration's ability to organize for success, including the appointment of a “double-hatted” deputy to both the national security adviser and the director of the Office of Management and Budget who could carry out a smart power strategy.
Syria s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant
As an upbeat and peaceful uprising quickly and brutally descended into a zero-sum civil war, Syria has crumbled from a regional player into an arena in which a multitude of local and foreign actors compete. The volatile regional fault lines that run through Syria have ruptured during this conflict, and the course of events in this fragile yet strategically significant country will profoundly shape the future of the Levant.
War From the Ground Up
As a British infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles Emile Simpson completed three tours of Southern Afghanistan. Drawing on that experience, and on a range of revealing case studies ranging from Nepal to Borneo, War From The Ground Up offers a distinctive perspective on contemporary armed conflict: while most accounts of war look down at the battlefield from an academic perspective, or across it as a personal narrative, the author looks up from the battlefield to consider the concepts that put him there, and how they played out on the ground. Simpson argues that in the Afghan conflict, and in contemporary conflicts more generally, liberal powers and their armed forces have blurred the line between military and political activity. More broadly, they have challenged the distinction between war and peace. He contends that this loss of clarity is more a response to the conditions of combat in the early wenty-first century, particularly that of globalisation, than a deliberate choice. The issue is thus not whether the West should engage in such practices, but how to manage, gain advantage from, and mitigate the risks of this evolution in warfare. War From The Ground Up draws on personal experience from the frontline, situated in relation to historical context and strategic thought, to offer a reevaluation of the concept of war in contemporary conflict. SHORTLISTED FOR THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER MEDAL FOR MILITARY LITERATURE 2013.
A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.